

The Tasmanian Government's Approach to Budget Repair

McKell Institute Budget Report

About this report

The McKell Institute is an independent, not-for-profit research organisation dedicated to advancing practical policy solutions to contemporary issues.

This report has been prepared by the McKell Institute Vic/Tas with the support of Unions Tasmania.

The report was prepared on the lands of the Palawa and Wadawurrung people.

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Foreword

Tasmania needs budget repair.

But while the state government has an obligation to manage money, it also must provide the services people depend on.

Tasmania's health and education outcomes are some of the poorest in the nation. Its population is ageing, which increases demands on healthcare. The state's economy is the smallest and among the slowest growing in Australia.

The 2026/27 Tasmanian Budget includes unprecedented cuts, designed as savings measures to help reduce state debt. A return to surplus is still some time away.

The trade-off is a cut to public sector jobs and to services, to especially healthcare. Tasmania simply will not be able to lift healthcare services and education outcomes without investment, nor without a strong workforce.

Long-term, these savings measures actually risk Tasmania's long-term economic outcomes, a view also shared by the Department of Treasury and Finance, and leading economist Saul Eslake.

Spreading the cost of budget repair and identifying fairer measures to reduce spending is the only fair and economically responsible way to make savings.

This report is the first in a series to be released by the McKell Institute in the coming months. We know Tasmania needs budget repair. But a way forward that gives cause for economic optimism, that is equitable, and doesn't leave people worse off, is essential for the state's future.

Rebecca Thistleton
Executive Director, Victoria and Tasmania

Executive summary

The Tasmanian Government faces significant and immediate financial challenges. As the Department of Treasury and Finance warned in its *Fiscal Sustainability Report 2026*, failure to address these challenges urgently will have extremely serious and potentially long-running consequences for Tasmanians.

However, contrary to the advice contained in the *Fiscal Sustainability Report*, or indeed the advice provided by economist Saul Eslake in his earlier *Independent Review of Tasmania's State Finances*, the Tasmanian Government has determined it will undertake the necessary budget repair solely by reducing expenditure.

This report analyses the 2026-27 State Budget—effectively the Government's response to the State's fiscal challenges—alongside the budget outcomes for Tasmania and the other states and territories over more than two decades. It finds:

- The overall spending cuts proposed for 2027-28 would be the largest in any state or territory this century
- The outlays proposed over the budget and forward estimates period would represent the most prolonged expenditure restraint in any state or territory this century
- The 2.1 per cent cut to health funding proposed for the current financial year would be the only instance this century where a state or territory government reduced total annual health expenditure (excluding the Northern Territory in 2022-23, which was entirely due to the unwinding of COVID-era programs)

The report finds the Government's approach therefore carries two key risks. On the one hand, implementing spending cuts on the scale proposed in the State Budget would likely result in substantial, negative impacts for the quality and availability of public services, in turn significantly impacting the Tasmanians who rely on them and the people who currently deliver them. On the numbers, the impacts would be far more severe than notorious examples like the austerity program implemented by Campbell Newman's Government in Queensland. According to the *Fiscal Sustainability Report*, the Government's approach will also cause the largest economic disruption of all available options.

On the other hand, by putting all its budget repair eggs in the spending cuts basket, the Tasmanian Government risks critical delays to the necessary task of returning the State to a sustainable financial position if it cannot deliver the unprecedented spending restraint it has outlined. As the *Fiscal Sustainability Report* makes clear, this would make the task, and impact, of budget repair in future years even more difficult.

The report concludes that the Tasmanian Government should therefore give urgent attention to alternative means of repairing the State's unsustainable financial position.

Background

The Tasmanian Government's financial position is unsustainable. Without immediate and sustained action, Tasmania's debt will rise to nearly \$130 billion by 2040, and the associated interest payments will consume half of all state revenues. Before this, barely five years from now, Tasmania's interest bill will begin increasing by more each year than the rise in total state revenues. At this point, budget repair will have become effectively impossible. It is infeasible this could occur without some form of intervention from financial markets or the Federal Government, placing Tasmania in the unwelcome company of places like Greece and Puerto Rico.

This is not the McKell Institute's opinion – it is the view outlined by Tasmania's Department of Treasury and Finance in its *Fiscal Sustainability Report 2026*.¹ In a document that makes for sobering reading, the report steps out the scale of the immediate financial challenge faced by Tasmania, the size of the response that will be required to avoid its most catastrophic projections, and the consequences of the various options currently before the Tasmanian Government. It finds that relying exclusively on expenditure cuts for budget repair will have the largest and longest-running negative impact on the broader Tasmanian economy.²


This mirrors the assessment of economist Saul Eslake in his *Independent Review of Tasmania's State Finances*, which found “it would be both difficult and undesirable” for a large proportion of the task of budget repair to be delivered through spending cuts. This is because he finds Tasmania already spends substantially less than is required to deliver a comparable level of services to people in other states and territories, currently collects considerably less revenue than it would if its tax framework more closely mirrored other jurisdictions, and because spending cuts “would have a bigger adverse impact on the Tasmanian economy, and on the most needy or vulnerable Tasmanians, than raising revenues by an equivalent amount”.³

It is in this context—an urgent need for immediate budget repair, and clear advice that spending cuts alone are not the answer—that the Tasmanian Government formulated the 2026-27 State Budget. How did it respond?

Analysis of the 2026-27 State Budget

The 2026-27 State Budget outlines a substantial correction to the State's financial position. If delivered, the Budget would return to an operating surplus of nearly \$200 million in less than two years, with further improvements out to 2030. This would represent an enormous correction from the 2025-26 financial year, in which the deficit was more than three times larger than the ones incurred at the height of the COVID pandemic. Not only that, it would also mean the Tasmanian Government would deliver the three largest operating surpluses since 2004-05, three years in a row.


Chart 1: Net Operating Balance, 2016-17 to 2029-30



Source: Treasurer's Annual Financial Reports 2016-17 to 2024-25; Preliminary Outcomes Report 2025-26; Tasmanian Budget 2026-27⁴

The improved operating position, plus a substantial slowing of the State's infrastructure program, results in a projected fiscal surplus from 2028-29. If this were to occur, the dramatic increase in net debt that has occurred since around 2022 would be arrested, peaking at just under \$10 billion in 2028-29 and beginning to fall from 2029-30. While Chart 2 (below) shows how significant Tasmania's debt levels would remain by historical standards, it would also mean that Tasmania's borrowing costs, including superannuation, would peak at 9.7 per cent of revenue in 2028-29, before falling to 9.3 per cent the following year.

Chart 2: Net debt, 2000-01 to 2029-30



Source: Treasurer's Annual Financial Reports 2003-04 to 2024-25; Preliminary Outcomes Report 2025-26; Tasmanian Budget 2026-27⁵


Contrary to the advice contained in the *Fiscal Sustainability Report* and the *Independent Review of Tasmania's State Finances*, the State Budget outlines that the substantial turnaround in Tasmania's financial position is to be achieved almost entirely through spending cuts.⁶ Total expenditure is set to fall from a preliminary outcome of \$10.8 billion in 2025-26, to \$10.4 billion two years later. This is followed by a slight uptick in 2028-29, though total expenditure would still be more than 3 per cent below current levels, three years on. In real terms, this would represent an average cut of nearly 11 per cent across every area of government, including schools, hospitals and emergency services.⁷

As Chart 3 (below) highlights, such a level of expenditure restraint would be unprecedented in recent Tasmanian history. Over the past 10 years, expenditure growth has averaged more than 7 per cent per year, with only one year (2024-25) recording an increase of less than 5 per cent. Even this result was largely due to the accounting treatment in the previous year of a large provision for claims for abuse suffered in state institutions, rather than any newfound fiscal discipline.⁸

Going back further, at no point in the twenty-first century has the Tasmanian Government ever spent less than it did in the previous year. Even the infamous 2011-12 Budget—widely recalled as Tasmania's "austerity" budget for its cuts to elective surgery and other public services—saw an increase in total expenditure of 1.8 per

cent. The 2026-27 State Budget proposes negative spending growth for two consecutive years, followed by the smallest increase (0.6 per cent) recorded this century. The result is that total expenditure will be more than 20 per cent lower than it would be in a scenario where spending growth continued at the rate as it has over the past decade.

Chart 3: Expenditure growth, 2016-17 to 2029-30




Source: Treasurer's Annual Financial Reports, 2016-17 to 2024-25; Preliminary Outcomes Report 2025-26; Tasmanian Budget 2026-27⁹

The Tasmanian Government proposes this unprecedented reduction in public spending will be achieved largely through the delivery of “Operational Efficiencies”, which are savings targets allocated to each department that require them to reduce expenditure by a certain amount each financial year. Across the four-year period, these amount to a combined reduction of nearly \$1.5 billion, with more than \$700 million to come from the Department of Health. More than 80 per cent of the total “Operational Efficiencies” come from just three agencies: the Department of Health, the Department of Education, Children and Young People, and the Department of State Growth (now renamed Building Tasmania).¹⁰

The Budget Papers indicate the “Operational Efficiencies” reflect a reduction of approximately 1,700 FTE public sector jobs, or more than 2,000 jobs by headcount.¹¹ The proposed job cuts “will be achieved progressively through natural attrition, workforce renewal and negotiated voluntary redundancies, consolidation of functions and reduced reliance on higher-cost staffing arrangements”.¹²

The proposed cuts also include a \$150 million “Efficiency Dividend” in 2026-27 remaining from the 2023-24 Budget, and approximately \$7.4 million from the “Budget Better Under Liberals” commitment from 2025-26, which pledged to reduce expenditure on agency marketing, lease arrangements and procurement processes.¹³

Chart 4: Operational Efficiencies by agency



Source: *Tasmanian Budget 2026-27*¹⁴

The approach taken by the Tasmanian Government to the necessary task of budget repair carries several key risks. First, by imposing an overall savings target on its departments, rather than outlining specific changes it is seeking to existing programs and the distribution of its workforce, the Government could in fact become far more inefficient. As Saul Eslake notes in his *Independent Review of Tasmania’s State Finances*, this approach is more likely to lead to services simply being provided with inadequate levels of staffing, resulting instead in greater inefficiency and poorer outcomes for the people and businesses who rely on them.¹⁵ Similarly, the approach taken to job cuts—vacancy control and voluntary redundancies—is a poor substitute for deliberate, strategic decisions about the workforce requirements of the Tasmanian Government, and could easily lead to a greater misallocation of staff than might presently exist.

Fundamentally, both of these issues arise because the Government is unwilling—likely for sound political reasons—to take responsibility for the consequences of the budget

savings it is seeking. This leads to a second risk of the approach, which is that the savings targets are simply not met. Numerous State Budgets since 2019-20 have included similar measures, and all on a smaller scale than currently proposed. The trajectory of the State's financial position since then would indicate there are significant obstacles to the approach being successful. The Government's refusal to consider other approaches to budget repair means there will be substantial consequences for the sustainability of Tasmania's finances if the single approach they have chosen is not implemented.


Finally, the Government's approach carries the risk of imposing outsized and unnecessary economic and social impacts on Tasmanians. As the Department of Treasury and Finance warned in the *Fiscal Sustainability Report*, relying exclusively on spending cuts will produce demonstrably worse outcomes for economic growth, household incomes, investment, employment and population growth, among other indicators. Similarly, the consequent reductions in public services—felt most acutely in longer hospital waiting lists, slower issuing of permits and less reliable emergency services—will be greater than they otherwise would have been if the Government had chosen to distribute the costs of budget repair more evenly across the community and the economy.

Implications for the Department of Health

The spending cuts outlined in the 2026-27 State Budget carry significant implications for key agencies. As the source of more than 35 per cent of current outlays, and the largest source of recent expenditure growth, the significant restraint proposed will necessarily impact the Department of Health.

Chart 5 (below) highlights just how significant the proposed spending cuts would be. The State Budget estimated total health expenditure of \$3.64 billion in 2025-26. The Preliminary Outcomes Report, released in August, outlined an additional \$95 million of expenditure connected to recently-signed wage agreements and demand-driven spending on supplies and consumables, for an updated total of \$3.74 billion.¹⁶ The Budget then proposes cutting expenditure by approximately \$78 million to \$3.66 billion in the current financial year, where it would essentially remain in 2027-28 following an increase of just \$7.5 million.

Chart 5: Health expenditure growth, 2019-20 to 2029/30




Source: Department of Health Annual Reports, 2019-2025; Preliminary Outcomes Report 2025-26; Tasmanian Budget 2026-27¹⁷

The implications of this for the delivery of health services is significant. Compared to a scenario where expenditure rose in line with the CPI anticipated in the budget, total health expenditure over the forward estimates period will be more than \$1 billion lower, including an annual shortfall of nearly \$300 million by 2027-28. This is equivalent to a cut of more than 7 per cent in real terms. Compared to a scenario where the post-

COVID expenditure growth continued, health funding will be nearly \$3 billion lower, with a shortfall in the final year of \$1.1 billion, or more than 22 per cent. Finally, compared to a scenario where average expenditure increases since 2019-20 continued, total funding will be nearly \$4 billion lower, with annual shortfalls rising to more than \$1.5 billion by 2029-30.


Chart 6: Health expenditure projections using CPI and historical data



Source: Department of Health Annual Reports, 2019-2025; Tasmanian Budget 2026-27¹⁸

There is no historical precedent for such long-running restraint of health expenditure, and it is not clear how this could possibly be achieved without affecting the delivery of health services to the Tasmanian community. The reason for this is that the vast majority of outlays by the Department of Health are related to the delivery of health services, either through the employment of health workers or the supplies and equipment needed to deliver healthcare. Workforce costs alone make up more than two-thirds of outlays, and more than 80 per cent of the workforce is employed in patient-facing roles. To save \$300 million annually, as would be required in the CPI scenario above, and to do so while maintaining its position of no frontline job cuts, the Tasmanian Government would have to cut the entire “backline” departmental workforce by between two-thirds to three-quarters. This would throw the entire health system into complete disarray. To save more than \$1 billion annually, as suggested in the other scenarios, would be simply impossible without cutting patient-facing jobs and services.

Chart 7: Department of Health workforce, 2024-25



Source: Department of Health Annual Report¹⁹


To an even greater extent than with the State Budget more generally, the implication of this is that the Tasmanian Government cannot possibly adhere to the funding levels outlined for the Department of Health without causing a significant negative impact on the quality and availability of health services provided to the Tasmanian community. Unless the Government is willing to revise its position of not introducing or increasing state taxes, the apparent alternative—simply allowing the Department to exceed its budget, without taking other actions to ensure that spending can be paid for—will result in a substantial deterioration in the State’s financial position. As the *Fiscal Sustainability Report* makes clear, postponing the point at which action is taken will result in even larger corrective action being required in the future. This highlights again how the Government’s insistence that budget repair will be achieved entirely through spending cuts is extremely risky.

The Tasmanian Budget in context

The scale of the proposed spending cuts is not just unprecedented in Tasmania. Since at least 2002-03—and probably much further back—no state or territory has reduced expenditure by as much as proposed in the 2026-27 State Budget, nor have they kept spending so restrained for such an extended period of time.

This can be measured in two ways. First, the Federal Parliamentary Budget Office collates data, based on information produced by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, relating to state and territory government finances.²⁰ Using Government Finance Statistics (GFS) accounting to ensure comparability across jurisdictions and time, their data indicates that of the combined 184 budget years since 2003-04, there have been only five occasions since where year-on-year expenditure has decreased.

Chart 8: Annual change in expenditure (GFS), 2003-04 to 2025-26




Source: Parliamentary Budget Office²¹

Nearly all of these instances of negative expenditure growth have an explanation beyond a State Government's fiscal policy. The two occasions in 2022-23, in New South Wales (-1.9 per cent) and Victoria (-3.5 per cent), were the result of the cessation of COVID-era health and stimulus spending, which had seen expenditures increase over the preceding three years by 47 per cent in New South Wales and 48 per cent in Victoria. The two instances in South Australia in the early 2010s were similarly linked to the fact that the years immediately prior had been temporarily inflated by stimulus funding provided by the Federal Government in connection with

the Global Financial Crisis.²² The sole remaining example, Queensland under Campbell Newman (-0.4 per cent), was the result of deliberate efforts to reduce public spending. The impacts this period had on public services still play a major role in Queensland politics today.²³

If the Tasmanian Government implements the spending cuts outlined in the 2026-27 State Budget, they would have reduced public spending by the largest amount of any state or territory this century, would have imposed two of the seven largest cuts to public spending in the space of two years, and would be the only government to have reduced spending in consecutive budgets. The cuts proposed for 2027-28 would represent a reduction in outlays nearly ten times more significant than those imposed by the Newman Government in Queensland.


Chart 9: Largest reductions in annual public expenditure since 2003-04, all states and territories



Source: Parliamentary Budget Office; Preliminary Outcomes Report 2025-26; Tasmanian Budget 2026-27²⁴

Collating each jurisdiction's reports of final budget outcomes—the equivalent of Tasmania's Treasurer's Annual Financial Report—produces a very similar picture. The second South Australian outcome from 2012-13 is no longer negative, while Western Australia (2019-20) and the ACT (2015-16) each show small annual declines of -0.64 per cent and -0.7 per cent respectively. Queensland's result under Campbell Newman is just -0.03 per cent, or more than 120 times smaller than the reduction in expenditure proposed by the Tasmanian Government for 2027-28. The cuts proposed for that year would remain the most significant on record in any Australian state or territory.

**Chart 10: Largest reductions in annual public expenditure
(Budget reporting), all states and territories**



Source: State end of year financial reports²⁵

Regarding health specifically, the Parliamentary Budget Office figures show there are only two instances over the same time period where total state or territory health funding has declined year-on-year. The first, an apparent cut of \$162 million (-7.3 per cent) in the Northern Territory in 2022-23, is entirely attributable to the unwinding of substantial COVID-era expenditure. Spending on disease prevention and health protection fell by \$272 million, or \$110 million more than the fall in total health outlays. Funding for hospitals increased 7.4 per cent and for primary care by 7.9 per cent.²⁶ The second, an apparent 2 per cent reduction in South Australia in 2013-14, is not borne out by the Department's audited financial statements for the year. These show an increase of \$81 million, or 1.8 per cent.²⁷ The difference is due to different treatments of grant and other funding under the GFS method used by the Parliamentary Budget Office.²⁸

Put another way, outside of the Northern Territory's substantial unwinding of COVID programs in 2022-23, no state or territory since the turn of the century has spent less on health than it did the year before. The funding cuts proposed by the Tasmanian Government would see funding reduced by 2.1 per cent in the current financial year, followed by an effective funding freeze (and real terms funding cut) in 2027-28. This would almost certainly have unprecedented negative impacts on the quality and availability of health services in Tasmania, a state which already has among the worst health outcomes in the country. Conversely, failure to reduce health spending as proposed will have a substantial, negative impact on the State's overall financial position, given the State Government's decision to rely solely on spending cuts to

address its budget problems and the large proportion of total outlays that relate to health services. As the *Fiscal Sustainability Report 2026* highlighted, this would delay the necessary and urgent task of budget repair, and make future efforts more challenging.

Conclusion

The Tasmanian Government faces significant and immediate financial challenges. As the Department of Treasury and Finance warned in its *Fiscal Sustainability Report 2026*, failure to address these challenges, more or less immediately, will have extremely serious and potentially long-running consequences for Tasmanians.

The Tasmanian Government outlined its response to these challenges in the 2026-27 State Budget. Contrary to the advice contained in the *Fiscal Sustainability Report*, or the advice provided by economist Saul Eslake in his earlier *Independent Review of Tasmania's State Finances*, the Tasmanian Government determined it would seek to undertake the necessary budget repair solely by reducing expenditure. It has definitively ruled out introducing new taxes or increasing the rate of existing ones, and repeatedly attacked political opponents who have proposed doing so.

This report has outlined how the approach chosen by the Tasmanian Government carries two key risks. On the one hand, implementing spending cuts on the scale proposed in the State Budget would likely result in substantial, negative impacts for the quality and availability of public services, in turn significantly impacting the Tasmanians who rely on them and the people who currently deliver them. The spending cuts proposed would represent the most significant and most prolonged example of expenditure restraint in any state or territory this century. As the largest area of State Government spending, the impacts on health would necessarily be substantial too. If implemented, the 2.1 per cent cut to health funding proposed for the current financial year would be the only instance this century where a state or territory government reduced total annual health expenditure, outside the Northern Territory's unwinding of COVID-era programs in 2022-23. Effectively, there is no precedent for what exactly spending cuts on this scale would mean for public services, but, on the numbers, the impacts would potentially be orders of magnitude more severe than notorious examples like the austerity program implemented by Campbell Newman's Government in Queensland.

On the other hand, by putting all its budget repair eggs in the spending cuts basket, the Tasmanian Government risks critical delays to the necessary task of returning the State to a sustainable financial position if it cannot deliver the unprecedented spending restraint it has proposed. As the *Fiscal Sustainability Report* outlined, this would make the task—not to mention the community and economic impact—of budget repair in future years even more difficult.

In conclusion, the spending cuts proposed by the Tasmanian Government will likely have serious negative impacts for the Tasmanian community, and, if history is any guide, be extremely difficult to implement. The Government should therefore give urgent attention to developing other means of repairing the State's unsustainable financial position.

References

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- ¹ Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Fiscal Sustainability Report 2026* (Hobart, 2026). Available [here](#).
- ² *Ibid.*, pp. 58-9.
- ³ Saul Eslake, *Independent Review of Tasmania's State Finances* (Hobart, 2025), pp. 6-7.
- ⁴ Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Treasurer's Annual Financial Reports, 2016-17 to 2024-25* (Hobart, 2017-2025), available [here](#); Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Preliminary Outcomes Report* (Hobart, 2026), available [here](#); Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Tasmanian Budget 2026-27* (Hobart, 2026), Budget Paper No. 1, available [here](#). Note that for comparative purposes the NOB for 2016-17 has been adjusted to remove the distortionary impact of the receipt of the ten-year funding agreement for the Mersey Community Hospital.
- ⁵ Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Treasurer's Annual Financial Reports, 2003-04 to 2024-25* (Hobart, 2004-2025), available [here](#); Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Preliminary Outcomes Report* (Hobart, 2026), available [here](#); Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Tasmanian Budget 2026-27* (Hobart, 2026), Budget Paper No. 1, available [here](#). For readers noting the apparent date discrepancy between the years in the chart and the listed source reports, the Treasurer's Annual Financial Report 2003-04 contains figures for the preceding five years. See [here](#).
- ⁶ The State Budget does outline revenue increases from various state taxes and dividends, though these are not the result of any change in government policy. There is an increase in the landfill levy that came into effect from 1 July, though this was legislated several years earlier and is already accounted for. The proposed short stay levy is perhaps one example, though this too was a policy decision from 2024 and the revenue has been earmarked for funding for housing programs. The State Government is also reviewing fees and charges, which might result in additional revenue.
- ⁷ Calculated using the inflation scenarios outlined in the State Budget.
- ⁸ For a discussion, see Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Treasurer's Annual Financial Report 2022-23* (Hobart, 2023). Available [here](#).
- ⁹ Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Treasurer's Annual Financial Reports, 2016-17 to 2024-25* (Hobart, 2017-2025), available [here](#); Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Preliminary Outcomes Report* (Hobart, 2026), available [here](#); Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Tasmanian Budget 2026-27* (Hobart, 2026), Budget Paper No. 1, available [here](#).
- ¹⁰ Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Tasmanian Budget 2026-27* (Hobart, 2026), Budget Paper No. 4, [p. 103](#).
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, Budget Paper No. 1, p. 8.
- ¹² *Ibid.*
- ¹³ See Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Tasmanian Budget 2025-26* (Hobart, 2025), Budget Paper No. 1, p. 8 and Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Tasmanian Budget 2025-26* (Hobart, 2025), Budget Paper No. 2, pp. 11-13.
- ¹⁴ Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Tasmanian Budget 2026-27* (Hobart, 2026), Budget Paper No. 4, [p. 103](#).
- ¹⁵ Eslake, p. 90.
- ¹⁶ Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Preliminary Outcomes Report* (Hobart, 2026), p. 3.
- ¹⁷ Tasmanian Government, Department of Health, *Annual Report 2018-19 to 2024-25* (Hobart, 2019-2025), available [here](#); Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Preliminary Outcomes Report* (Hobart, 2026), available [here](#); Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Tasmanian Budget 2026-27* (Hobart, 2026), Budget Paper No. 2, [p. 103](#).
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹ Tasmanian Government, Department of Health, *Annual Report 2024-25* (Hobart, 2025), [pp. 101-5](#).
- ²⁰ Australian Government, Parliamentary Budget Office, *2026-27 National Fiscal Outlook*. Data retrieved from data explorer available [here](#).
- ²¹ *Ibid.*
- ²² For a discussion, see Government of South Australia, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Final Budget Outcome 2010-11* (Adelaide, 2011), pp. 5-11. Available [here](#).

²³ Among many examples, see Australian Broadcasting Corporation, “Analysis: This week in Queensland politics saw the ghost of Campbell Newman past haunt Labor and the LNP” (2023), available [here](#).

²⁴ Australian Government, Parliamentary Budget Office, *2026-27 National Fiscal Outlook*. Data retrieved from data explorer available [here](#). Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Preliminary Outcomes Report* (Hobart, 2026), available [here](#); Tasmanian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, *Tasmanian Budget 2026-27* (Hobart, 2026), Budget Paper No. 1, available [here](#).

²⁵ For New South Wales, see [here](#), for Victoria, see [here](#), for Queensland, see [here](#) onwards, for Western Australia, see [here](#) (older versions available through the Wayback Machine, e.g. [here](#)), for South Australia, see [here](#), For Tasmania, see [here](#), for the Northern Territory, see Territory Stories (e.g. [here](#)) and for the ACT, see [here](#).

²⁶ Government of the Northern Territory, Department of Health, *Department of Health Annual Report 2022-23* (Darwin, 2023), p. 89. Available [here](#).

²⁷ Government of South Australia, “Report of the Auditor General: Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2014 - Part B: Agency Audit Reports (Volume 2)”, pp. 756-814. Available [here](#).

²⁸ Notably, as mentioned above, the PBO figures (using GFS) showed total South Australian State Government expenditures falling in the same year, when State Government reports did not. See [here](#).